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Abstract 
The volume of large-value funds  transfers in the money, foreign exchange and 
securities markets has increased manifold during the last decade. This development 
has increased interbank debt positions and extensions of intraday credit resulting 
from payment transactions in the payment-intermediation sector. Systemic risk in 
these arrangements refers to the risk that one clearing system participant's failure to 
settle will cause one or more other participants to default. The danger of systemic 
failure exists in a clearing system in which payment messages are exchanged during 
the day but funds are transferred only at the end of the day. In this study, simulation 
with empirical data is used to measure the probability, extent and resulting effects of 
a systemic crisis in the Finnish payment system. 
The major finding of  the study is that one participant's failure to settle in the 
Finnish payment system can cause serious problems for other participants but the 
danger  of systemic  failure  is  relatively small.  On  average  the  banks'  largest 
counterparty risks are low and amount to less than 10 per cent of their own funds. 
However, on some days counterparty risk can amount to over 50 per cent of banks' 
own funds and thus constitute a systemic risk. Large counterparty risks however do 
not form long interbank chains that could lead to a domino effect. Even should a 
payment system participant suddenly be unable to settle, the other participants would 
probably manage to avoid serious problems. 
Although the simulation results indicate that presently the probability of 
systemic crisis in Finland is quite small, it is still important that payment system risk 
control be further developed. The environment in which the payment system operates 
is developing very rapidly, and risks are growing as volumes increase. As the system 
opens up to foreign credit institutions, Finnish payment system participants also find 
themselves dealing with more and more counterparties about whom they have no 
prior knowledge. System entry and risk control can no longer be based solely on trust; 
clear game rules are needed. As part of its task of overseeing payment systems, the 
central  bank will  need  to  closely monitor  system  developments,  promote  risk 
awareness in the markets and payment systems, and prevent the creation of systems 
in which it is possible for settlement failures to spread. This work should be done in 
cooperation with international organizations and the ED. 
Keyword: systemic risk, clearing, settlement, Finland 
3 Tii vistelma 
Rahamarkkina-, valuutta-ja arvopaperikauppaan liittyvien  suurten maksujen volyy-
mi on moninkertaistunut viimeisen vuosikymmenen kuluessa. Kehitys on johtanut 
aikaisempaa  suurempiin  maksuliikenteesta aiheutuviin  pankkien  valisiin  velka-
positioihin  ja paivansisaisten  luottojen  syntymiseen  maksujenvalityssektorissa. 
SysteemiriskilIa tarkoitetaan riskia, etta yhden maksujarjestelman osapuolen maksu-
hairio johtaa yhden tai useamman muun osapuolen maksuhairioon. Maksujarjestel-
missa systeemiriskin toteutumisen vaara on olemassa selvitysjarjestelmissa, joissa 
maksusanomia vaihdetaan paivan aikana, mutta maksujen katteet siirretaan vasta 
paivan paatteeksi. Tassa selvityksessa pyritaan empiirista tietoa kayttavien simuloin-
tien avulIa arvioimaan systeemiriskin toteutumisen todenakoisyytta,  laajuutta ja 
seurannaisvaikutuksia Suomen maksujarjestelmassa. 
Selvityksen keskeinen tulos on, etta yhden osapuolen kyvyttOmyys selviytya 
katevelvollisuudestaan voi  aiheuttaa muille osapuolille  vakavia hairiOita,  mutta 
systeemiriskin vaara on suhteellisen pieni. Pankkien suurimmat paivittaiset vasta-
puoliriskit ovat keskimamn alle kymmenen prosenttia pankkien omista paaomista. 
Huippupaivinaan vastapuoliriskit voivat kuitenkin olIa yli  50 % pankin omasta 
paaomastaja voivat siten myos laukaista systeemiriskin. Suuret vastapuoliriskit eivat 
kuitenkaan kertaudu ja  muodosta pitkia pankkien valisia ketjuja, joissa domino-efekti 
paasisi toteutumaan. Vaikkajokin maksujarjestelman osapuolijoutuisi ylIattaen vaka-
vaan  maksuhairioon,  niin  muut  osapuolet  todennakoisesti  selviytyisivat  siita 
joutumatta itse vakavaan kriisiin. 
Vaikka suoritettujen simulointien perusteelIa systeemiriskin todennakoisyys 
on Suomessa talla hetkelIa melko vtihainen, tulee maksujarjestelmien riskienhallintaa 
edelIeen kehittaa. MaksujarjestelmaymparistO kehittyy varsin nopeasti ja maksujen 
volyymien kasvun myota myos riskit kasvavat. Jarjestelmien avautuessa ulkomaisille 
luottolaitoksille suomalaisetkin maksujarjestelmaosapuolet joutuvat tekemisiin yha 
useampien, aikaisemmin tuntemattomien osapuolten kanssa. Paasy jarjestelmiin ja 
jarjestelmien riskienhallinta ei voi enaa perustua pelkkaan luottamukseen, vaan on 
oltava olemassa selkeat pelisaannot. Keskuspankin tulee osana maksujarjestelmien 
valvontatehtavaansa seurata jarjestelmien kehitysta tiiviisti, edistaa markkinoiden ja 
maksujarjestelmien riskitietoisuuden lisaantymista seka pyrkia ennalta ehkaisemaan 
selIaisten jarjestelmien syntymista, joissa maksuhairioiden leviaminen on mahdolIis-
ta. Tata tyota on tehtava yhteistyossa kansainvalisten jarjestOjen ja EU:n kanssa. 
Avainsanat: systeemiriski, maksujarjestelmat, selvitysjarjestelmat, Suomi 
4 Foreword 
Internationally, there has been relatively little empirical research on payment systems 
and related risks. This study, which uses empirical data on Finnish payment systems, 
is one initiative to add to this area of  research and increase our knowledge of 
systemic risks in payment systems. It was inspired by the Italian and D.S. studies on 
the same topic and especially by the visit and lectures of the author of the Italian 
study, Mr. Paolo Angelini, to the Bank of Finland in November 1994. 
Veikko Saarinen 
Head of Payment Systems Office 
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7 1  Introduction 
During the past decade, integration and turnover growth in the financial markets, the 
creation of new financial instruments and rapid technological development have led 
to a manifold increase in the total value of payment flows in the payment systems. 
Both internationally and in Finland, the volume of  large-value funds transfers in the 
money, foreign exchange and stock markets has increased rapidly. In 1993 the value 
of funds transfers was nearly as much as 100 times GDP in Japan and Switzerland; 
in Finland it was 13 times GDP and in Luxemburg the ratio was the lowest, 3 times 
GDP (Chart 1). 
Chart 1.  Value of  funds transfers in the payment systems of 












c  ,.  ...  IL  ., 
:::I  Z 
Source: BIS and central banks (Italian data from 1994; Irish, Greek and 
Luxembourg data from 1992). 
This study attempts to measure empirically the probability, extent and resulting 
effects of a systemic crisis in the Finnish payment system. Systemic risk refers to the 
risk that one clearing system participant's inability to settle will cause one or more 
other participants to be unable to settle. Systemic risk can lead to a systemic crisis, 
ie an undermining of  the stability of  the whole system, if  the failure of one participant 
to settle sets off a chain reaction wherein a significant number of system participants 
are unable to settle. 
There is a danger of systemic crisis in a payment system in which payment 
messages are exchanged during the day but covering funds are not transferred until 
the end of the day. In the absence of effective risk control systems, large intraday 
positions may, in the event of a settlement failure, lead to liquidity problems and to 
settlement failure by a second and third participant and even to an undermining of the 
stability of the entire financial system. In order to prevent payment problems from 
spreading and to contain systemic risk, the central bank may be obliged to provide 
support to a system participant facing payment problems and to take upon itself the 
9 credit risk involved. The central bank then implicitly assumes the role of guarantor 
of  the system's stability. This may to some extent reduce participants' incentive to pay 
attention to the risks inherent in the payment system.  1 
In  order to  reduce  the risk associated with payment intermediation ,and 
indirectly their own risk in connection with payment systems, central banks have 
made suggestions and recommendations for improving system security. One means 
of improving  system  security  that  has  recently  been  given  high  priority  is  a 
changeover to real-time gross settlement systems, in which individual payments are 
immediately final and irrevocable. 
To reduce its own credit risk, the central bank requires the banks to have 
adequate reserves for settling payments and, in connection with intraday credit, either 
requires the posting of collateral or sets bank-specific overdraft limits (caps). These 
procedures however increase system participants' liquidity needs or reduce payment 
flow and can thus impair the fluidity of the payment system. At worst, a lack of 
liquidity can lead to payment gridlock, in which the system grinds to a halt as each 
participant awaits payment from another participant. In order to unlock the system, 
the central bank may be obliged to temporarily assume the risks associated with the 
payments of a particular participant. 
The supervisory role and interests of the central bank in connection with the 
payment  system  are  related  to  the  preservation  of the  system's  stability  and 
operability. One key objective is to minimize the systemic risks that derive from the 
actions of third parties and other externalities. In practice, this refers to efforts to 
reduce systemic risk and gridlock of funds transfers. 
Section two contains a general description of  the risk structures of alternative 
settlement arrangements. In section three we  discuss  those parts  of the Finnish 
payment  system  that  are  relevant  to  the  settlement process  and  consider  their 
exposure to systemic risk. In section four we use empirical methods in an attempt to 
quantify potential systemic risk in the Finnish net settlement systems, and section five 
contains the concluding remarks. 
I  This is so-called moral hazard problem. 
10 2  Large-value transfer systems and 
systemic risk 
In the context of a payment system, the settlement method (gross or net) and what it 
implies for the timing of  payment finality have a crucial impact on the risks and costs 
involved. 
2.1  Characteristics of different types of 
settlement systems 
Table  1 shows the risks  associated with net and gross settlement systems.  The 
purpose is to provide a rough comparison of the risks inherent in the two types of 
settlement systems in order to provide a thumbnail sketch of the risks involved in 









Central bank risk 
Efficiency 
Costs 
Characteristics of large-value funds transfer systemsl 
Net settlement systems  Gross settlement systems 
Without safety  Limits and loss- Noncollateralized Collateralised 
features  sharing  intraday credit  intrady credit 
high  low  none  medium 
high  small  none  none 
high  low  none  none 
none  low  none  medium 
high  low  none  none 
high  medium  very high  low 
high  medium  high  medium 
low  medium  low  high 
1 Following Schoenmaker 1994. 
In Table 1 settlement risk refers to the risk that a third party's payments are not made 
on time because the entire settlement is either delayed or aborted due to a single 
participant's failure to settle. Besides risk classifications, the table gives efficiency 
and cost levels for the two types of settlement. Efficiency here refers to the fluidity 
of  payments intermediation from the viewpoint of  system participants. In practice this 
refers to the system's liquidity needs or to the flexibility with which liquidity can be 
obtained. The costs involved are the costs of system reserves or the liquidity that is 
tied up in the form of collateral. The table does  not include a valuation of the 
technical or legal risks involved. 
11 The key legal risk relates to the finality of netting. Even if the obligations 
under netting are clearly stated in the clearing agreement, they will not necessarily be 
legally valid because, for example, bankruptcy law might take precedence. There is 
in principle a small legal risk attached to the multilateral netting of securities deals 
in the Helsinki Money Market Center clearing system. In a possible conflict, Finnish 
bankruptcy law would take precedence and the bankruptcy trustee would have the 
right to demand the unwinding of a netting. In practice, it would not be reasonable 
for the trustee to make such a demand. If  the netting were unwound and the debtor 
failed to settle, the posted collateral would revert to the clearing centre and would 
thus not be available to the trustee. However, securities legislation in Finland is being 
developed so as to ensure the legal validity of netting. If  the participant were to go 
into bankruptcy before the clearing centre had guaranteed the trade, the participant's 
loss due to the  interruption of the trade would be the 'replacement cost' of the trade. 
Both net and gross settlement have their advantages, nor is there unanimity 
of opinion as to the optimal type of settlement system. In Europe the emphasis in 
limiting intraday credit risk in payment systems has been on the collateral for intraday 
credit while in the USA discussion has focused on the pricing of intraday credit (eg 
Humphrey 1989 or Mengle, Humphrey and Summers, 1987). Recommendations 
made  by European  central  banks  (Minimum  Common  Features  for  Domestic 
Payment Systems 1993) have clearly favoured wider use of  real-time gross settlement 
systems. The main argument for this choice is the desire to minimize the systemic 
risk of the payment system. 
2.2  Settlement of payments in Finland 
In Finland the most important large-value interbank payments are settled by the gross 
method in the central bank's system. In connection with their current accounts at the 
Bank of  Finland, the banks are required to post collateral for intraday credit, and there 
are  bank-specific  limits  on  the  amount  of intraday  credit  (present  collateral 
requirement is 100 per cent for all banks). There is no credit risk to participants, and 
the central bank's risk is small. The collateral requirement is costly to participants, 
and liquidity shortages are possible (see Table 1, last column). Although interbank 
payments are at the final stage settled by the gross method, there are also interbank 
arrangements for netting payments prior to final settlement. These include the netting 
of cross-border markka-denominated (loro) payments, ordinary domestic customer 
payments and payments in respect of domestic securities trades. Loro payments are 
generally large-value payments whereas customer and securities trade payments can 
be large  or small.  In the  netting  arrangements  for  loro  and  ordinary  payment 
transactions, the settlement risk profile is nearly the same as in the second column of 
Table  1,  ie the risks  to  both the participants and the central bank are large.  In 
securities trade (Helsinki Money Market Center and Helsinki Stock Exchange), the 
risk profile is closest to that of the third column, ie participants' risks are small 
because of the collateral requirements. In the following section, the above-mentioned 
aspects of Finland's payment system will be examined in greater detail. 
12 3  Payment and settlement systems in Finland 
To provide some background for the analysis,  we examine brieflY' the Bankof 
Finland interbank funds transfer system (BOF system), which is a real-time gross 
settlement system, as well as loro clearing, ordinary payment clearing and zeroing of 
postal  giro  accounts,  which  are  net  settlement arrangements.  We conclude by 
examining the net settlement system used in securities trade. 
3.1  The Bank of Finland interbank funds 
transfer system (BOF system) 
In the Bank of Finland's interbank funds transfer system, interbank payments are 
based on real-time gross settlement. The participants in the system make account 
transfers at their own workstations and can monitor their account balances in real 
time. Payment messages and covering funds are transferred synchronously, so that 
payments are final immediately upon execution. The transfer of covering funds for 
transactions in other systems (such as banks' ordinary customer payments, cross-
border markka (loro) payments and Helsinki Money Market Center and Helsinki 
Stock Exchange payments) is based on net settlement. Clearing systems linked to the 
BOF system are shown in Chart 2. 
In a real-time gross settlement system, no credit risk arises to the participants 
from having to wait for covering funds because the payment message and covering 
funds are transferred synchronously. Since there is no uncertainty attached to the 
effecting of the payment, there is  no settlement risk,  which also eliminates the 
possibility of a systemic crisis stemming from the payment system. The intraday 
credit collateral requirement and credit limits reduce the central bank's credit risk 
while  on  the  other  hand  increasing  participants'  liquidity  risk.  The  collateral 
requirement increases banks' costs and so reduces their propensity to use central bank 
credit. However, poor liquidity slows down payment transfers and may at worst result 
in system gridlock. Consequently, the central bank must aim for a suitable balance 
between its own credit risk and the efficiency and flexibility of banks' payment 
transfers. At present, banks' credit limits in the BOF system are fairly high, which 
reduces the likelihood of payment system gridlock. In spite of this, it has been 
necessary to temporarily increase banks' intraday limits; and actual gridlock has once 
occurred but there has never been an unwinding of settlement. 
In  October  1995  the  introduction  of averaging  provisions  for  banks' 
minimum reserves at the Bank of Finland and the transfer of reserve deposits to 
banks' current accounts in the BOF system allowed banks greater flexibility in their 
intraday liquidity management. Now banks can also even out intraday variations in 
payments by adjusting their reserve holdings. This has reduced the gridlock risk. 
13 Chart 2. 
14 
Clearing systems linked to the Bank of  Finland interbank 
funds transfer system (BOF system) 
NET SETTLEMENT OF BANKS' PAYMENT CLEARING 
(giros, reference giros, express transfers, recurrent payments, 
direct debits, cheques, bank drafts, card debits) 
NET SETTLEMENT OF BANKS' POSTAL GIRO ACCOUNTS 
(Postipankki) 
NET SETTLEMENT OF LORO CLEARING 
(Cross-border Finnish markka payments) 
NET SETTLEMENT OF HELSINKI MONEY 
MARKET CENTER CLEARING 
NET SETTLEMENT OF HELSINKI 
STOCK EXCHANGE CLEARING 
9.00  i 
11.00  12.00  13.00  14.00  14.30  15.00 
INTERBANK TRANSFERS 
AND 
ACCOUNT HOWERS' WORKSTATIONS 
BANK OF FINLAND'S OTHER ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS 
16.00  16.30 Gross settlement of interbank payments has been in effect in Finland since 1991. 
Multilateral netting of money market transactions began when the Helsinki Money 
Market Center started operations in April 1992. In spite of this, the markka volume 
of interbank payments transferred to the BOF system has been increasing steadily 
(Chart 3). Internationally too, the value of  interbank payments has continued to grow, 
also in relation to GDP (cf. BIS 1994, p.  173). 
Chart 3.  Trend in the volume of transactions in the BOF system! 
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1 The time series have only been compiled since the changeover to the 
gross settlement system (ie since 1991). In Finland the most rapid growth 
in the volume of interbank payments took place in the 1980s, when the 
money market was undergoing rapid development. 
2 As from 18 March 1991. 
3.2  Payment netting systems 
3.2.1  Loro clearing system 
Loro payments are banks' cross-border Finnish markka payments. Banks clear their 
mutualloro payments during the day and the net covering funds are transferred in the 
BOF system at about 2.30 p.m. The largest banks clear payments bilaterally; smaller 
banks use Merita Bank or Postipankki as  their loro clearing agent.  In bilateral 
settlement, the remitting party transfers covering funds from its own current account 
to the recipient's current account. In the centralized clearing system, the clearing 
agent transmits data on each loro clearing participant's claims/debts to the Bank of 
Finland, which makes the necessary account transfers in the BOF system. 
15 The markka volumes of loro clearing have at times been relatively large. 
Loro clearing volume is a little over FIM 3 billion per day on average (April-May 
1994). The following table 2 presents some key bank-specific figures on multilateral 
clearing. 
Table 2.  Daily net positions of  banks in multilateralloro clearing, 
April-May 1994 (FIM million) 
Bank  Average  Maximum  Minimum 
A  -5  463  -311 
B  -67  1311  -1522 
C  -37  1 135  -1499 
D  19  40  -75 
E  31  779  -690 
F  0  10  -2 
G  43  973  -1473 
H  -1  22  -25 
I  2  254  -330 
J  -11  826  -497 
K  25  955  -1210  . 
Total clearing volume  3095  6636  662 
+ = receivable, - = payable 
3.2.2  Banks' Payment Clearing System 
Throughout each banking day, banks transmit data on their customers' payments-
related debits and credits to each other. Each clearing bank nets bilaterally against all 
other banks the payment orders effected in its branch network and automated teller 
machines. The nettings are reported to the Bank of Finland and covering funds are 
transferred to the banks' accounts at the Bank of Finland in connection with the daily 
payment clearing at about 3.45 pm. Daily turnover in payment clearing amounted on 
average to just over FIM 3 billion in April-May 1994; even at its lowest it was FIM 
1.7 billion (Table 3). The annual volume of  payments has been increasing continually 
(Chart 4). 
16 Chart 4. 
Table 3. 
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Daily net positions of banks in multilateral payment 
clearing, April-May 1994 (FIM million) 
Bank  Average  Maximum  Minimum 
A  -23  18  -809 
B  -696  863  -2107 
C  -104  110  -495 
D  1  33  -2 
E  33  147  0 
F  288  1948  -410 
G  228  582  1 
H  -275  -94  -554 
I  196  1043  -875 
J  351  2069  -1 742 
Total clearing volume  3254  5117  1722 
+ =  receivable, - = payable 
3.2.3  Net  settlement of  banks' postal giro accounts 
Almost all banks have a postal giro account at Postipankki for making payment 
transfers. Previously these accounts were used for making transfers between the bank 
giro and postal giro systems. However, with the increasing integration of the two 
systems, the use of postal giro accounts has  diminished.  At present, postal giro 
accounts are mainly used in connection with certain central government payments 
which by law must be paid via the postal giro system. The balances on banks' postal 
giro  accounts  are zeroed in the daily clearing by transferring postal giro  credit 
17 balances to the appropriate banks' BOF accounts and transferring funds from the 
appropriate BOF accounts to cover postal giro debit balances. 
The average daily volume of postal giro  accounts zeroed was FIM 400 
million in May-April 1994, ie much lower than that of loro or ordinary payment 
clearing.  Table 4  presents  some key figures  for  April-May  1994.  Because this 
clearing is of minor importance, it is not dealt with separately in the empirical part 
of this study. 
Table 4.  Daily net positions of banks in multilateral postal giro 
clearing, April-May 1994 (FIM million) 
Bank  Avera~e 
A  -2 
B  -62 
C  -84 
D  292 
E  -45 
F  -37 
G  1 
H  -64 
I  0 
Total clearing volume  391 
+ = receivable, - = payable 
3.3  Securities netting systems -























The Helsinki Money Market Center Ltd (HMMC) is a clearing and settlement centre 
for transactions in money market book-entry securities. At the HMMC, clearing can 
be done on either a trade-by-trade or net basis. In trade-by-trade settlement, the 
settlement schedule and terms  and conditions can be determined by the parties 
involved; net settlement is carried out in regular phases. The operating model of the 
HMMC fulfils the minimum requirements set by the Group of Thirty (1989) on 
securities clearing and settlement? 
Normally, the delivery date for spot transactions in the money market is the 
second day after the trade. Instruments are delivered against a payment effected 
simultaneously in the BOF system. On the day preceding delivery, the HMMC checks 
the parties' ability to pay and calculates the net obligations, which replace the gross 
payables and receivables. At this stage, the system requires sufficient collateral from 
the purchaser clearing party to ensure that the trades can be effected. After the 
clearing  run,  each  party  has  only  one  net  sum  due  to  or  from  the  HMMC. 
2  Vehkamiiki (1992) discusses the HMMC operating model in more detail. 
18 Correspondingly, there isa single delivery obligation or claim for each instrument 
type. 
The HMMC guarantees payment even in case of payment disturbances 
between the parties involved. The payment guaranteeGOmes into effect as soon as the 
HMMC has cleared the trade, ie on the day preceding delivery. If  a clearing party is 
unable to pay its net liability, the HMMC grants the party credit against the above-
mentioned collateral. This type of payment guarantee is essential in a multilateral 
netting system in order to avoid an unwinding of a chain of trades and a possible 
domino effect. The Bank of  Finland guarantees the HMMC's ability to pay and grants 
it liquidity credit, if necessary, against full collateral. Through their investments in 
share capital, HMMC shareholders stand behind the obligations of the HMMC. Thus 
any possible losses would be distributed between the shareholders pro rata to their 
shareholdings. 
The markka volume of the trades settled at the HMMC has grown rapidly to 
almost FIM 1,600 billion (Chart 5).  Almost one-half of the trades settled at the 
HMMC are internal trades between intermediaries. However, the markka value of 
internal trades is much smaller than that of interbank trades, which account for the 
bulk of  the volume. In addition to commercial banks, the State Treasury and the Bank 
of Finland account for a significant share of the trades settled at the HMMC. 
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19 4  An analysis of systemic risk in Finnish 
net settlement systems 
The danger of a systemic crisis is present in systems where payment messages are 
exchanged in the course of  the day but covering funds are not transferred until the end 
of the day. In Finland loro payments and ordinary payments are settled in this way. 
In this section, the exposure of  these activities to systemic risk is analysed empirically 
and the results are compared with findings of similar studies done in other countries. 
4.1  Results of studies carried out in other countries 
Very little empirical research has been done on the systemic risk associated with 
payment systems. The main studies that have been published are those of  Humphrey 
(1986) and Angelini, Maresca and Russo (1993). Humphrey analyses the effects of 
systemic risk on the US Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) by 
simulating the chain reaction that would follow a system participant's failure to settle. 
The simulation is carried out by 'unwinding' the netting, ie deleting from the netting 
all funds transfers to and from the problem bank and recalculating the net positions 
of the remaining  participants.  Negative  changes  in position resulting  from  the 
recalculation are compared with the liquidity of  the respective participants and those 
banks that are found to lack sufficient liquidity are deleted from the netting and the 
net positions are again recalculated. The process continues until all parties to a 
netting are able to fulfil their obligations. The scope of a possible systemic crisis is 
measured by simulating the domino effects of payment failures. Humphrey's data 
covers two randomly chosen business days, and the simulation is carried out for one 
direct  participant  in  the  CHIPS  system  and  one  indirect  participant  (uses  the 
intermediation services of a direct participant) . 
The main finding of Humphrey's study is that one participant's failure to 
settle has far-reaching consequences. Almost half of the CHIPS particpants failed to 
settle their obligations due to knock-on effects. The value of cancelled payments 
amounted to about one-third of the total value of the payment messages sent on the 
day in question. This shows that systemic risk can be significant in CHIPS and that 
its consequences may be of a magnitude sufficient to disrupt the entire financial 
system. After Humphrey's study CHIPC has enhanced its risk management systems 
and nowadays  it fulfils  the  so-called Lamfalussy standards  for  multilateral net 
settlement systems. 
Angelini et al. apply the same approach to study the Italian payment system. 
However, their data is more comprehensive than Humphrey's data, and they examine 
the probability of systemic crisis and the consequences for all the system participants 
over all the business days in a month. In contrast to Humphrey's findings, the main 
outcome of the Italian experiment is that the probability and consequences of a 
systemic crisis  are  rather insignificant.  Hence, from the  standpoint of financial 
stability,  systemic  risk  cannot  be  considered  a  problem,  at  least  at  present. 
Nevertheless, if payment flows were to grow rapidly, the situation could change, and 
20 therefore it is desirable that risk management methods be improved with a view to 
the future.  . 
The clearing organization Multinet International has studied the effect of net 
settlement of foreign exchange trades on the magnitude of systemic risk{.see Glass 
1994). The study, which is based on simulations carried out over one business day, 
finds that systemic risk is a significant threat to international foreign exchange trade 
and may have far-reaching consequences if  risk management is ignored. In Multinet 
however positions vis-a.-vis the clearing centre are minimized through multilateral 
netting, and the clearing centre's risks are covered by collateral requirements. In this 
manner,systemic risk and possible knock-on effects are eliminated. 
Schoenmaker  (1995)  analyses  the  differences  between  gross  and  net 
settlement systems in order to clarify which system is closer to the social optimum. 
He finds  that the extra costs  of the liquidity requirements  for  gross  settlement 
outweigh the benefits gained from the elimination of systemic risk. In other words, 
it would be less costly to use a net settlement system which includes bilateral limits 
and collateral cover of net positions. In Schoenmaker's model however it is assumed 
that the central bank is risk neutral, and as the author points out, the outcome of the 
analysis could be different if the central bank were assumed to be risk averse. 
4.2  Estimation methodology and data 
4.2.1  Methodology 
The methodology used here to study systemic risk associated with net settlement 
systems corresponds to that used in similar foreign studies (Humphrey 1986, Angelini 
et al. 1993). This study attempts to estimate the probability and scope of  systemic risk 
by using expost settlement data and simulating situations in which a participant fails 
to settle and is deleted from the netting. 
The simulation is carried out by recalculating the net debit/credit positions 
of the remaining participants each time one problem bank is removed from the 
netting. All payments to and from the problem bank are deleted from the netting and 
new net positions are calculated for the remaining banks. If  the change in a bank's net 
position is  negative enough it implies  an  insolvency situation and the bank is 
considered to have failed.  An insolvency is defined to obtain if the net position 
deteriorates by more than 50 per cent of the bank's own funds (cf section 27 of the 
Commercial Bank Act).  Banks that fail  by this criterion are  removed from the 
settlement  and  the  remaining  participants'  net  positions  are  recalculated.  This 
'unwinding' procedure is repeated until all remaining banks are able to fulfil their 
obligations. 
As a second criterion we use illiquidity and so the adequacy of the overdraft 
limit on a bank's current account at the Bank of  Finland is checked once another bank 
has been removed from a netting. The purpose here is to estimate the liquidity and 
gridlock risk under the assumption that the central bank does not automatically raise 
a participant's overdraft limit to enable it to borrow more and remain in the netting. 
The debits and credits obtained in this simulation are added to the the banks' current 
21 account balances at the start of the clearing run, and the new balance for each bank 
is compared with the bank's overdraft limit. If  the limit is exceeded, the netting is 
unwound by removing the defaulted bank from settlement and recalculating the net 
positions of the remaining participants. The new account balances are· compared to 
the respective limits of remaining banks and again the defaulting banks are deleted 
from the netting. This procedure is repeated until all the remaining banks have 
adequate liquidity, ie the net positions do not exceed the respective limits. 
4.2.2  Data 
The simulations were run using transactions data from the Bank of Finland's current 
account system. They consist of the bilateral net positions (clearing and settlement 
of  loro and ordinary payments) which are determined in the daily clearing run. A two-
month period was used for the study. One month represents a fairly normal month 
(May 1994) and the other an exceptionally 'lively' month (April 1994) in terms of 
current account activity. Systemic and gridlock risk simulations were carried out for 
every bank on every business day during both months. 
The bilateral net positions after a clearing run reflect only interbank positions 
at the end of the clearing period. An exact analysis of risk positions would require 
time-series data on intraday net positions.  Such data are  not available,  and this 
limitation must be borne in mind in interpreting the results. However, it is fairly 
unlikely that a participant in the Finnish banking system would default unexpectingly 
on just a few hours' notice. 
It is also worth noting the limited scope of a study of systemic risk which 
focuses on net clearing over a certain period. Such a study cannot estimate the effects 
of serious settlement failure  of a bank on other segments of the economy.  The 
combined  effect  of one  participant's  problems  on  the  different  markets  may 
accumulate in such a way that a counterparty's crisis tolerance may be exceeded. This 
paper however focuses specifically on the risks associated with the funds transfer 
system. 
4.3  Results of the study 
In simulating the probability of systemic crisis,  the  choice of the criterion for 
triggering a crisis is crucial. In this study, two different criteria are used. First, the 
effects of one participant's settlement failure are compared with the other banks' own 
funds  for the purpose of assessing the risk of a chain reaction of bank failures. 
Second, we examine the effects on participants' net positions in their current accounts 
at the Bank of  Finland and the adequancy of intraday credit limits. The purpose here 
is to estimate the disruption or gridlock risk associated with the illiquidity of one or 
more participants in the net settlement. 
22 4.3.1  The relationship between credit risks and own funds 
The probability that the default of one bank will have chain effects on loro clearing 
and ordinary payment clearing is fairly small. In respect of ordinary payment clearing, 
the counterparty risk of only one of the banks under review exceeded half of its own 
funds. Using this as a criterion, the bank in question would have failed altogether six 
times as a result of failures of other banks. However, not one of these failures would 
have resulted in serious payment disruptions for other banks. In the case of clearing 
and settlement of  cross-border markka payments, the corresponding counterparty risk 
limit (50 per cent of a bank's own funds) was exceeded four times during the period 
studied. In these cases however the margin by which risk limit was exceeded was 
smaller than in ordinary payment clearing (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Finnish banks' own funds  are  large relative to  the volume of interbank 
clearing. Moreover, banks' outgoing and incoming payments often practically match, 
thus reducing the size of banks' bilateral net payments. Although the probability that 
a payment failure of one bank will cause another bank to fail is relatively small, 
exposure to counterparty risk may nevertheless cause considerable problems, eg in 
respect of capital requirements or unpredicted market reactions. The 50 per cent own 
funds  criterion used in this study is not very strict, as  a bank's solvency may be 
jeopardized by smaller exposures. 
Appendix Charts 1 and 2 show each domestic bank's largest daily net debit 
position as  a percentage of its own funds in loro clearing and ordinary payment 
clearing. Tables 5 and 6 below depict the average and maximum sizes of these net 
debit positions in respect of  both types of  clearing. A bank's largest net debit position 
represents its maximum bilateral clearing exposure. In ordinary payment clearing, the 
largest bilateral net debit position represented 93  per cent of own funds; in cross-
border markka payment clearing the maximum was 55 per cent. These averages are 
not in themselves relevant to system risk, but they illustrate the general levels of 
counterparty risk. In cross-border markka payment clearing, the largest risk recorded 
amounted to 8 per cent of the bank's own funds; in ordinary payment clearing 7 per 
cent. There appears to be no notable difference between risks in April and May. 
Measured in markka terms, the maximum counterparty risks are substantial. 
In ordinary payment clearing, the largest international debit markka position of a 
single participant was more than FIM 1.5 billion; in cross-border markka payment 
clearing, the corresponding figure was as much as FIM 2.5 billion. 
23 Table 5.  Maximum counterparty risks in ordinary payment 
clearing, April-May 1994 
Bank  Largest .net debit position  Largest net debit position 
averagez  % of  own funds  maximumz % of own funds 
A  4  16 
B  11  30 
C  18  92 
D  2  11 
E  0  4 
F  3  19 
G  15  40 
H  3  14 
All banks  7  92 
Table 6.  Maximum counterparty risks in toro clearing, 
April-May 1994 
Bank  Largest net debit position  Largest net debit position 
averagez  % of own funds  maximumz % of own funds 
A  1  8 
B  15  55 
C  5  37 
D  11  31 
E  9  53 
F  0  5 
G  14  53 
H  9  34 
All banks  8  55 
4.3.2  Risks in connection with current account positions 
and credit limits 
This section examines liquidity risks associated with net clearing and settlement. The 
own-funds criterion used in the previous section is replaced by the overdraft-limit 
criterion. By adjusting the credit risk associated with net clearing according to banks' 
intraday positions at the time of clearing, it is possible to estimate the probability that 
a bank will fail because of a liquidity shortfall (gridlock risk) as a consequence of 
another bank's failure to settle. If, because of a settlement failure, one of the banks 
is  excluded  from  clearing,  this  may  cause  liquidity  problems  for  the  other 
participants, and without the central bank's assistance the entire payment system may 
end up in gridlock, ie a situation where payment flows are stemmed. 
24 In the case of  ordinary payment clearing, the simulation experiment indicates 
that it is fairly unlikely that liquidity problems will occur and a gridlock situation 
arise when one participant defaults. Settlement failure simulation produced only two 
cases where the intraday credit limit was exceeded. On both occasions, the same bank 
triggered the systemic crisis. The limit overruns represented 59 and 14 per cent, 
respectively, of the bank's limit. However, on both occasions repeated simulation did 
not produce any new multiple settlement failures. Except for these two cases, all 
parties managed to settle their clearing commitments within their intraday credit 
limits irrespective of which bank was assumed to fail. 
Appendix Chart 3 shows the extent to which banks used their current account 
overdraft facilities in settling their ordinary payment obligations assuming the largest 
possible counterparty failure occurred at every clearing round. Of the eight limit 
overruns shown in the chart, six reflect situations in which the bank actually (not only 
in simulation) exceeded its overdraft limit. Naturally, banks' liquidity was otherwise 
tight during the days under review, and even a minor settlement failure could have 
caused problems for them. In such conditions, simulating and interpreting the results 
are difficult, since in practice the central bank has already bailed out the banks by 
granting them the required extra liquidity and thus the simulation assumption that the 
central bank holds a very tight rein on its lending does not hold. In respect of the 
actual  overruns  in  April-May,  the  major counterparty  settlement failures  were 
nonetheless relatively small and if they had occurred on a 'normal' day, they would 
not have had a serious impact on banks' liquidity. 
In loro  simulations  there  were  a  total  of .15  limit  overruns.  In these 
simulations, the problem is that the large banks do not necessarily settle at the same 
time as the settlement of the net debts of small banks as calculated by Merita Bank. 
This may result in inaccuracies when comparing the balances on the banks' current 
accounts at the central bank. The aim has been to handle these problems case by case. 
Appendix Chart 4  shows the degree to  which banks  used their current 
account overdraft facilities in settling their loro payments in situations where the 
largest possible counterparty failure occurred at every netting round. Table 7 shows 
the banks' limit overruns in the simulations. Systemic crises led to a total 15 credit 
limit overruns for April-May. However, the overruns triggered in the simulations 
were often fairly small. On average, an overrun amounted to 21 per cent of the bank's 
limit. In value terms, the overrun due to counterparty failure amounted to FIM 884 
million on average,  and to about FIM 2.2 billion at maximum.  After one bank 
defaulted, repeated simulation did not lead to any further overruns. 
According to the results, it is more probable that one counterparty failure 
causes another counterparty failure in loro settlements than in ordinary settlements. 
The data used here shows no marked correlation between loro  settlements and 
ordinary settlements. Under such circumstances, the combination of the two types of 
settlement should not result in an increase on average in credit risk associated with 
net settlement. Similar results were obtained from settlement failure simulations 
using simulated data for combined loro, ordinary and postal giro settlement. 
25 Table 7.  Simulated credit limit overruns in loro settlements, 
April-May 1994 
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4.3.3  Systemic risk analysis of the HMMC net clearing and 
settlement system 
The systemic risk associated with funds  transfers  in  money market trade  at the 
Helsinki  Money  Market  Center  (HMMC)  clearing  and  settlement  system  was 
analysed by carrying out settlement failure simulations similiar to those reported 
above on all the business days in August 1994. The trigger for a settlement failure 
was 50 per cent of a particpant's own funds. Table 8 shows the participants' largest 
daily counterparty risks for August. Appendix Chart 5 shows the ratio of each bank's 
largest bilateral net claims to its own funds. 
26 Table 8.  Participants' largest daily counterparty exposures 
at the HMMC, August 1994 
Largest bilateral net credit  Largest bilateral net credit 
position, interbank trade  position, total tradel 
% of own funds  % of own funds 
A  10  42 
B  4  8 
C  13  116 
D  7  8 
E  6  18 
F  25  462 
G  8  8 
I  Including Bank of Finland, State Treasury, Export Credit Ltd and the 
Regional Development Fund of Finland trades. 
The banks' bilateral net credit positions in connection with securities transactions are 
relatively small. In part, this is due to the fact that securities trading by the Bank of 
Finland and the State Treasury as well as interbank trade is free of counterparty risk. 
As is discernible from the above table, the potential counterparty risk in relation to 
participants' own funds was fairly small in August 1994. The largest bilateral net 
credit positions amounted to 25 per cent of the respective bank's own funds. The 
simulations did not lead to any new settlement failures. The Helsinki Money Market 
Center system is protected against multilateral netting exposure by means of a 
requirement of full collateralization of overdrafts. 
27 5  Concluding remarks 
The arguments concerning systemic risk are generally based largely on assumptions 
and  calculations  using  theoretical  models,  because  there  are  very  few  actual 
observations available. In this study, simulations with ex-post settlement data are 
used to evaluate the exposure to systemic risk of the net-settlement parts of the 
Finnish payment system. Using simulation, assumptions must again be used, but in 
this way one is able to get a rough picture of the counterparty risks inherent in the 
real-life payment system and the consequences of a potential settlement failure. 
One participant's failure to settle in the payment system can lead to serious 
problems for other participants. However, on the basis of our simulations of net 
settlement, the danger of systemic failure and the extent of the consequences are at 
present relatively small in Finland. On average the banks' largest daily counterparty 
risks amount to less than 10 per cent of  their own funds. However, on peak days these 
risks can amount to over 50 per cent of own funds and thus pose a systemic risk. The 
50 per cent criterion applied in this study is not very strict, as banks' ability to operate 
may clearly be seriously impaired if much smaller problems arise. If we had used a 
10 per cent criterion, the simulations would have produced daily situations in which 
one bank's failure to settle would have caused potential payment problems for other 
participants. 
The key result of the simulations was that large counterparty risks do not 
snowball into long interbank chains that could lead to a domino effect. Even if a 
payment system participant were to suddenly encounter a serious payment problem, 
the other participants would probably manage to avoid serious crises. If another 
participant encountered a payment problem, the difficulty would probably end at that 
point and not lead to a longer chain reaction involving other parties. 
The probability of  liquidity and gridlock problems was estimated using as the 
default criterion the overrun of an overdraft limit on a current account at the Bank of 
Finland. The probability of a liquidity problem is higher for loro clearing than for 
ordinary payment clearing. The key result was that in ordinary payment clearing the 
elimination of one bank from the clearing because of a liquidity problem, would 
cause another bank to exceed its overdraft limit on two days and in loro clearing the 
second bank would exceed its overdraft limit on 15 days out of  40. The limit overruns 
did not however spread to more than two banks. 
Using empirical data from the Helsinki Money Market Center, simulations 
of settlement defaults. to study systemic risk in securities payments indicated that the 
counterparty risks are small. This is partly because a large share of trades were free 
of counterparty risk, ie they were internal to the banks, the Bank of Finland or the 
State Treasury. In respect of ordinary interbank trades, HMMC is protected from 
systemic risk with the aid of the full collateral requirement. 
In international comparisons, the exposure of Finland's payment system to 
systemic risk seems to be roughly of the same magnitude as has been found in the 
Italian study. In Finland and Italy, the counterparty risk inherent in net settlement 
systems appears to be of a significantly smaller magnitude than in corresponding US 
systems. With respect to Finland, the main reason lies in the structure of our payment 
and banking systems. Compared to large countries (Japan, USA), the total payment 
flow  in  the  Finnish  system is  relatively  small  relative  to  GDP  (see  Chart  1). 
28 -Moreover, our interbank payment system-is a gross settlement system and thus net 
settlement constitutes just one part of the Finnish payment system. And because of 
the centralized nature of the Finnish banking system, a large share of the flow of 
customer payments remains within the same bank or banking group. 
Although the simulations with empirical data indicate that in Finland the 
probability of a systemic crisis is presently quite small, it is important to continue to 
develop risk control and management systems for payments. The environment in 
which payment systems operate is changing rapidly, and as the volume of payments 
grows so do the risks. As their systems are opened up to foreigners, Finns also will 
find  themselves  dealing  more  and  more  often  with  heretofore  unknown 
counterparties. Entry into the system and system risk control can no longer be based 
solely on trust; instead, clear playing rules must be put in place. Within its task of 
overseeing the payment system, the central bank will need to monitor developments 
closely, promote market awareness of payment system risks and aim to prevent the 
creation of systems in which it is possible for settlement failures to spread. This work 
should be done in cooperation with international organizations and with the EU. 
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